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Book Reveiws
Administrative Law Text. By Kenneth Culp Davis. St.
Paul. West Publishing Company, 1959, pp. xxiv, 617. $8.00.
Perhaps no other test of a book is so all-conclusive as
pitting it against its avowed objectives. Does it meet, in
satisfactory manner, those objectives? Mr. Davis states'
that he is writing "... exclusively for law students. ... not
for practitioners, not for judges, not for administrators,
and not for legal scholars." Being, by choice, a teacher of
law students, Mr. Davis feels qualified to set forth those
items which he believes they want in a text, namely :2
".... significant problems to be opened up for them.
They want informational background, and they want
reasons, pro and con. They want to know the general
drift of the authorities and they want spirited criticism of the authorities. They want ideas to spark their
own imagination in trying to solve problems. They
want the foundations for formulating their own
opinions on major issues. They want illustrations and
concreteness, not abstraction."
Measured against even this formidable array, it can
quite fairly be said that Mr. Davis's book answers such
needs most adequately.
His approach to the shibboleth of "separation of
powers" is at once frank and refreshing. He takes little
time and less space to demolish this erstwhile bastion of
administrative law as it was viewed and taught even as
recently as this reviewer's law school days, using as his
wrecking tool Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting statement8
that in describing administrative agencies as ". . . quasilegislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within
the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution," the
courts have implicitly confessed ". . . that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth
cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use
a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed." In seeking to
direct the student's approach to this matter, Mr. Davis lays
1

8

DAVIS, IX.

Ibid.
F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487 (1952).
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down the view that the principal guide is that of check,
not separation, of powers; for ". . tyranny or injustice
lurks in unchecked power, not in blended power." 4 Concomitantly, he points out that in the federal courts, the
doctrine of nondelegation of power has been so far watered
down as to be of relatively small importance while also
making it clear that the same doctrine has found favor
in many state court decisions. Having disposed of these
matters, Mr. Davis plunges exuberantly into the work of
dissecting and analyzing the many other facets of his
chosen field.
While recognizing full well that oft-times one may
become impatient and irritated in his contacts with some
of the individuals who collectively make up the vast agglomeration of boards and commissions on both state and
federal levels, it is nonetheless regrettable that at times
Mr. Davis allows his feelings to discolor an otherwise
dispassionate treatment of his subject. His repetitive use
of the term "petty," carrying with it a sense of smallmindedness or unyielding rigidity of position, to denote
those agency officials or employees who carry out the
lesser functions of such bodies, detracts from his work and,
so far as this reviewer's experience is concerned, is largely
without warrant. But of more importance, this attitude,
manifested by one of the real authorities in administrative law, may bias students against such persons before
they appear or practice before one or more of these many
agencies.
That Mr. Davis has not merely produced a work of
great scholarship, but has at the same time demonstrated
a very practical working knowledge of the various administrative agencies themselves was forcefully brought
home to the reviewer by the coincidental reading of Mr.
Davis's chapter entitled "Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating," and Mr.
Louis Loss's Foreword to the October, 1959, issue of the
Virginia Law Review, devoted in its entirety to "Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation." Mr. Davis,
in critically pointing out the virtual unreviewability of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's exercise of its
supervisory powers, they being neither adjudicatory or
legislative,5 went on to illustrate their awesome coerciveness so far as registrants under the federal securities acts
' DAVIS, 30

-69 § 4.01.
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are concerned." It was, therefore, noted with a great deal
of interest that Mr. Loss, who has written the landmark
ITo the reviewer, whose administrative agency experience has been
gained primarily in the field of securities regulation, it seems that Mr.
Davis, steeped as he Is in his subject, assumes for the student a knowledge of this specialized field of corporate finance which few, if any, students
possess, and by so doing loses some of the force of his illustration of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's coercive powers over registrants,
after the deficiency letters have been complied with and the final price
amendment has been filed, via the granting or withholding of acceleration
when he summarily says that at this point In the issuer's registration
process, "[blusiness reasons usually make acceleration of amendments s;)
compelling that the registrant is willing to yield to onerous conditions".
(70). To assign "business reasons," rather than explaining that it is the
fear of the collapsing of the underwriting contract which is the force
involved, seems oversimplification. In practically every large public offering of securities, the issurer (a) in the case of a negotiated sale of
bonds or equity securities not having preemptive rights, executes a purchase contract with an investment banking house in which it is agreed
that the investment banker will purchase all of the offered securities at
a certain price, or (b) In the case of a negotiated underwriting of equity
securities which do have preemptive rights, executes an underwriting
contract which provides that for a fee, plus not infrequently certain profit
sharing possibilities and additional fees for shares "laid-off," the underwriter will purchase at a certain price all of the offered securities which
are not subscribed for by the issuer's stockholders under their preemptive
rights within a stated number of days (usually about two weeks) after
the initial public offering. This latter firm-commitment type of underwriting contract is the issuer's assurance that it will receive at least the
agreed-upon price for Its securities even if it cannot sell any of them
to such stockholders. The underwriter's fee to the Issuer for underwriting
the sale of the preemptive securities Is based, of course, on several factors
such as the past performance of the issuer in earnings, its standing in the
industry, and the current state of the market generally in the type of
securities being issued. Overriding all of this, however, Is the fact that,
in the case of bonds or nonpreemptive equity securities, the purchase price
is predicated upon the registration statement becoming effective promptly
after the underwriting agreement is signed, and, in the case of a preemptive
offering of securties, the underwriter's fee is predicated on this same
factor. Under the Federal Securities Laws, the underwriter is unable,
until the registration statement becomes effective, to "lay-off" or spread
(through sales) the risk of having to take up and pay for the unsubscribed
securities. Since securities markets fluctuate, often with great rapidity,
the price which the underwriter agrees to pay for the securities is one
based on his judgment of the market at the moment. However, without
substantially increasing his fee to protect himself against possible declines In the market, no underwriter is willing to remain solely liable for
the securities at a set price withlout being able to sell for a period of
twenty days after the making of the underwriting contract. It is customary, therefore, for the underwriter and the issuer to conclude that
the underwriter's fee and the price which he agrees to pay for the
securities will be based upon the registration statement promptly
becoming effective. To this end the underwriting contract contains a moreor-less standardized paragraph which provides:
"The obligations of the Underwriter to purchase and pay for the
[Securities offered under the registration statement] will be subject
to . . .the following conditions:
(a) The Registration Statement 8hall have become effective not
later than [a stated hour] -Standard
Time, on the second bu8ines8
day following the date of thi8 Agreement. . ...'
Here the SEC's power to grant or withhold acceleration following the
filing of any amendment to the registration statement comes into proper
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work in the securities field,7 should be making the same
point in his Foreword when he wrote: s
"Still another matter which cannot be reiterated
too frequently is the largely theoretical nature of judicial review in great areas of the Commission's work.
In the case of Securities Act registration especially,
there is no need to belabor the point that the Commission - if not a Branch Chief or Assistant Director
of Corporation Finance - is the Supreme Court of the
United States to all intents and purposes." (Emphasis
added.)
This is corroborative evidence, if indeed such were
needed, of Mr. Davis's keen insight into a very technical
and detailed segment of administrative law.
In only two instances involving substantive analysis of
decisions of the Supreme Court did this reviewer find Mr.
Davis's delineations somewhat hard to follow. First, in his
chapter on Bias,9 Mr. Davis, after noting that "[bias] in
the scene of crytallized point of view about issues of law
or policy is almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification," reviews the minority position as expressed
focus. The student must visualize the registration statement relating
to the security as filed with the 'SEC containing almost all of the
necessary statements and disclosures with respect to the issuer and the
security save for the price at which the security is to be sold. This price
is not fixed until a day or two before the contemplated offering and is
then negotiated between the issuer and the underwriter in the execution
of the underwriting agreement. The issuer then files its price amendment
to the registration Statement and requests acceleration of the newly
begun 20-day waiting period which, as Mr. Davis explains, was activated by
the filing of such amendment. The grant of acceleration then becomes vital
in the face of the above-quoted provision In the underwriting contract and
this is the compelling "business reason" to which Mr. Davis refers. Unless
acceleration is granted, the underwriter folds its tent and slips away,
while the registrant solaces itself by gnashing it corporate molars.
Finally, Mr. Davis did not make it clear that no such "acceleration"
problems exist in the case of a registration statement covering securities to
be offered at competitive bidding. Rule 415 of the 'SEC requires the
issuer to include in such registration statement an undertaking "to file an
amendment to the registration statement reflecting the results of the
bidding, the terms of the reoffering and related matters . . ." and provides that the order declaring such a registration statement effective for
bidding, "shall be deemed to declare... [the price] amendment thereto...
effective at the time such [price] amendment is filed" unless a stop-order
proceeding has been previously instituted. This effectively removes the
necessity for requests for acceleration upon the filing of the price amendment to such registration statements.
7Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION (1951) supplemented (1955). Mr. Loss,
in 1951 Associate General Counsel for the SEC, is presently Professor of
Law at Harvard University.
845 Va. L. Rev. 787, 791 (1959).
9 DAVIs, 215, Chapter 12.
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by the British Committee on Ministers' Powers ° (quoted
with approval by the Administrative Law Committee of
the American Bar Association" that "[b]ias from strong
and sincere conviction as to public policy may operate as
a more serious disqualification than pecuniary interest."
In commenting on the view of the British Committee,
Mr. Davis refers to the case of F.T.C. v. Cement Institute.2
In his description of the factual background, he states:"
"The Commission had issued a cease and desist
order against use of a multiple basing-point system in
the selling of cement. The Commission before instituting the proceeding had made reports to Congress
and to the President expressing the opinion that the
multiple basing-point system was a violation of the
Sherman Act. The companies contended that the Commission had expressed a 'prejudgment of the issues'
and that it was 'prejudiced and biased.' The Court
specifically said that it was deciding 'on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its
prior official investigations.' Then the Court held that
the Commission's previously formed opinion 'did not
disqualify the Commission.'
Without reference to the Supreme Court's opinion here,
one would be entitled (aside from the extremely oblique
reference to the Commission's "prior official investigation") to assume from Mr. Davis's text that the Federal
Trade Commission had of its own initiative and without
directive or other sanction from Congress, begun a study
of the multiple basing-point system and filed its conclusion
with respect thereto with Congress and the President in
an effort (a) to secure legislative action with respect to
such system, or (b) to have the President direct the Attorney General to institute proceedings against the cement
companies under the Sherman Act, all in addition to the
action which the Federal Trade Commission planned under
the Federal Trade Commission Act. If this had been the
fact, then the Supreme Court's refusal to hold the Commission disqualified for bias would have been quite extreme. Upon reading the full opinion, however, one finds
very sound grounds upon which the court could and did
10Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) 78.
"61 A.B.A. Rep. 734 (1936).
"333 U. S. 083 (1948).
DAVis, 216.
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reach its conclusion. It pointed out that one of the cement

companies :14
"[I]ntroduced numerous exhibits intended to support its charges [that the Federal Trade Commission
had previously prejudged the issues and was prejudiced and biased against the cement industry]. In the
main these exhibits were copies of the Commission's
reports made to Congress or to the President, as required by § 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C.A. § 46. [This section of the act states in part
that "The Commission shall have power... (d) upon
the direction of the President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to
any alleged violation of the antitrust acts by any corporation.] These reports, as well as the testimony
given by members of the Commission before congressional committees, make it clear that long before
the filing of this complaint the members of the Commission at that time, or at least some of them, were
of the opinion that the operation of the multiple basing
point system as they had studied it was the equivalent
of a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act." (Emphasis added.)
The court went on to state that the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as a result of its prior
investigations did not mean that the minds of the members
were closed on the subject of the defendant's basing point
practices for here the industry participated in the hearings
and produced some 49,000 pages of testimony on the matter. It concluded:
"[The argument that because the Commission had
previously concluded that the operation of multiple
basing point system was a violation of the Sherman
Act] . . . if sustained, would to a large extent defeat
the congressional purposes which prompted passage
of the Trade Commission Act. Had the entire membership of the Commission disqualified in the proceedings against these respondents, this complaint could
not have been acted upon by the Commission or by
any other government agency. Congress has provided
for no such contingency. It has not directed that the
Commission disqualify itself under any circumstances,
has not provided for substitute commissioners should
14

Supra, n. 12, 700 et 8eq.
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any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized
any other government agency to hold hearings, make
findings, and issue cease and desist orders in proceedings against unfair trade practices. Yet if [the complainants are] right, the Commission by making
studies and filing reports in obedience to congressional
command, completely immunized the practices investigated, even though they are 'unfair,' from any cease
and desist order by the Commission or any other
governmental agency.
"There is no warrant in the act for reaching a
conclusion which would thus frustrate its purposes.
If the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from
acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would appear that
opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair
trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them
from ever passing on another.... Thus experience acquired from their work as commissioners would be a
handicap instead of an advantage. * * *
"Neither the Tumey decision [holding it a violation
of procedural due process for a judge who had a direct
personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant, to try, convict, and commit him to jail] nor any
other decision of this Court would require us to hold
that it would be a violation of procedural due process
for a judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an
opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were
prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the
same case more than once and decide identical issues
every time, although these issues involve questions of
both law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court."
While this case does reject the view of the British
committee, it would certainly seem that the student would
be more likely to understand the basis for such rejection
had Mr. Davis placed this case under his discussion of
"The Rule of Necessity."' 5 In that section, he quite well
points up [though for some reason without using this case
as an illustration] the principle that "many cases recognize a clear reason for disqualification, but, nevertheless,
hold on the basis of the rule of necessity that the tribunal
5 DAVIs,

221, § 12.04
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should act" for without such action persons might enjoy
immunity from violations of the law.'"
The second of these matters arises in what is probably his most scintillating and instructive chapter Official
Notice. 7 Having there stated the proposition
8
that: 1
16See Timbers and Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions, 45 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1959), which brings
this matter down to tlate in discussing the case of Gilligan, Will d Co.
, 4 L. ed.
U. S.
v. SEC. 267 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir., 1959), cert. den.
2d 152, 80 S. Ct. 200 (1960). There a broker-dealer involved In the distribution of securities in the Crowell-Colier case was, on August 9, 1957,
named in an order of the SEC which commenced, administrative proceedings
against the broker-dealer and others. On August 12, 1957, and before the
briefing and argument of the case before the Commission (hearing and
recommended decision by hearing examiner having been waived by stipulation), the Commission issued a press release (Securities Act Release No.
3825) in which it indicated that Gilligan, Will & Co., along with others,
had violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 by its distribution of
unregistered securities of Crowell-Oollier. Thereafter, following briefs
and argument, the Commission found a violation of such act by the
defendant (Securities Act Release No. 5689, May 7, 1958) and suspended
it from membership In the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.,
for five days.
The broker-dealer appealed to the Second Circuit, contending among
other things that the Commission, by its press release of August 12, 1957,
had prejudged the matter. The Second Circuit dismissed this contention
on the ground that the broker-dealer's failure to raise such issue before
the Commission was a waiver of such objection on appeal. Nonetheless,
referring to the bias, or prejudgment, Issue the court cited C'ommissioner
Sargent's statement (unreported but set out in Appellant's Brief) of his
reason for not participating in the hearing "because I reached a defilnite conclusion of law upon findings of fact on August 12, 1957," and
said (267 F. 2d 461, 468-469) :
"While we of course express no opinion on the correctness of
Commissioner Sargent's assertion that §5 of the Administrative Procedure Act does not permit such participation as occurred here by the
Commission Itself In both the release and subsequent proceedings, we
think it appropriate to express our doubts whether such participation
was either necessary or desirable.
". .. the Commission's reputation for objectivity and impartiality
Is opened to challenge by the adoption of a procedure from which a
disinterested observer may conclude that it has in some measure
adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance
of hearing it."
Here is the critical reaction of the Second Circuit that denouncement,
ahead of the hearing, of the acts of the defendant by the agency prosecuting
the defendant was neither "necessary or desirable."
In the Cement Institute case, 333 U. S. 683 (1948) such action, as
noted above, was required by Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and a denouncement by the F.T.C. without such responsibility imposed by statute could well have fatal results so far as a later hearing is
concerned.
1
7DAvIS, 267, Chapter 15, which begins with the statement that "[n]o
other major problem of administrative law surpasses in practical importance the problem of use of extra record Information in an adjudication."
18Ibid., 269, § 15.02.
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"Whatever the proper limits on official notice may
be, those limits apply only to proceedings in which a
trial type of hearing is required. Far more difficult is
the determination of what fact finding is subject to the
limits when it is clear that a trial type of hearing is
required. Two Supreme Court cases give rise to the
question whether a tribunal may use extra-record
information as it chooses, without giving parties a
chance to meet the information, when the information bears upon devising a remedy or imposing a
penalty."
After having considered one administrative agency case,
he discusses a criminal case in the final development of
this theme. Recognizing the difficulty involved in using a
criminal case to illustrate his point, Mr. Davis notes that
0 case, which ".... may have unduly broadened
the Williams"
the principle" [that a tribunal may use extra-record facts
bearing on a remedy or penalty], did "not involve administrative action, but the basic problem of fairness - of due
process - is the same in all types of adjudications. 0 He
then proceeds to consider that case, wherein the Supreme
Court affirmed the action of the New York Court of Appeals2' which had affirmed a conviction of murder and the
imposition of the death sentence by the trial judge despite
the jury's recommendation of a life sentence. The trial
judge had decided on the death sentence for the defendant
after receipt of a pre-sentence probation report which
covered some thirty other burglaries by the defendant in
the same area where the murder was committed, and
which pointed up other distasteful propensities of the
defendant. Having set out these facts, Mr.22 Davis follows
with the Supreme Court's flat holding that:
"In determining whether a defendant shall receive
a one-year minimum or a twenty-year maximum sentence, we do not think the Federal Constitution restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information received in open court. The due process clause
should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure. * * * We cannot say that the due process
clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge
"Williams v. New York, 337 U. S.. 241 (1949).
DAVIS, 270.
298 N.Y. 803, 83 N.E. 2d 698 (1949).
Supra, n. 19, 251-252.
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gets additional out-of-court information to assist him
in the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the
death sentence."
He states that the court reached this result by reasoning
that a trial judge has to rely on extra-record probation
reports because "3 "... the modern probation report draws
on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's
life. The type and extent of this information make totally
impractical if not impossible open-court testimony with
cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay
criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues."
From this, Mr.Davis concludes that this is the Supreme
Court's guide to administrative agencies in their own use
of extra-record facts. Certainly, this seems an unwarranted
conclusion when the adjudicative process (if one may
so divide a criminal case) was fully completed when the
defendant had been convicted by a jury on record facts
so that the only use of extra-record facts was not to determine adjudicative facts at all, but merely to assist in sentencing the defendant.
Although one might wish at times (for who among us
has not done the same thing?) that Mr. Davis would not
conclude that on a particular point the better reasoned
opinions support his views, whilst aligning with any dissent from such conclusions the less well-thought-out decisions;24 or that he would pontificate less dogmatically upon
what the Supreme Court will or will not do in the future
on various issues,2 5 it would certainly be unfair to hold out
that such matters detract seriously from a most effective
and erudite work. This text serves a very definite need and
is a fine distillation of the disciplines which abound in this
field of law.
BIRD H. BISHOP*
24

Ibid., 250.
DAviS, 291, § 15.14.
Ibid., 294, § 16.04, "The Supreme Court since the Panama case [293 U.S.

388, (1935)] has not again assigned constitutional reasons for the findings
requirement, and it is unlikely to do so."
* A.B. 1942, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1950, University of Maryland School of Law.

